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Abstract—The family of Information Dispersal Al-
gorithms is applied to distributed systems for secure
and reliable storage and transmission. In comparison
with perfect secret sharing it achieves a significantly
smaller memory overhead and better performance, but
provides only incremental confidentiality. Therefore,
even if it is not possible to explicitly reconstruct data
from less than the required amount of fragments, it
is still possible to deduce some information about the
nature of data by looking at preserved data patterns
inside a fragment. The idea behind this paper is to
provide a lightweight data fragmentation scheme, that
would combine the space efficiency and simplicity that
could be find in Information Dispersal Algorithms with
a computational level of data confidentiality.
I. Introduction
Fragmenting data and dispersing them over differ-
ent physical locations through several transmission paths
slows down an attacker from obtaining the totality of the
original data. Data are usually transformed into fragments
by the use of secret sharing [26], information dispersal
algorithms [21], or data shredding [5], [9].
The choice of the most appropriate fragmentation
method depends on the particularity of a given use case.
A user has to balance between memory use, performance
and desired confidentiality level. Fragments obtained with
perfect secret sharing are highly secure, but the technique
is slow and very costly in memory. Information dispersal
is resilient and relatively fast, but not secure. Combining
symmetric encryption with fragmentation is secure and
easily scalable, but in some circumstances may be less
efficient than information dispersal [23].
A fragmentation technique for long-term archival stor-
age of large data will usually differ from the one applied
to disperse small data packets. In the last case, the choice
would be to pick some lightweight fragmentation tech-
nique, like information dispersal or a fast computational
secret sharing scheme, rather than to apply more complex
mechanisms [12], [18].
The idea of an Information Dispersal Algorithm(IDA)
was first introduced by Rabin in the late 80s [21]. Broadly,
the algorithm multiplies data chunks by a matrix in order
to obtain fragments that are a linear combination of
the chunks’ data and matrix elements. The recovery is
only possible when a certain amount of these fragments
is being gathered. Rabin’s IDA has several advantages:
it adds resilience to data, produces almost no storage
overhead and uses simple arithmetic operations. Although,
the scheme guarantees only incremental confidentiality.
An eavesdropper knowing the dispersal matrix can ver-
ify if a fragment has a predetermined value. Moreover,
such attacker can guess the content of missing fragments
when data have recognizable patterns. Despite of such
problems, IDAs are still taken into consideration in the
context of data protection, as the obstacle of not being
able to explicitly reconstruct initial data from less than
required amount of fragments may be sufficient in some
scenarios [2]. Such scenarios include all use cases were
memory or performance overhead caused by secret sharing
or cryptographic operations may be a burden and data
protection requirements are not too high. An example
could be a fragmented database [1], [7] where we would
like to quickly retrieve records or a multipath transmission
where we would like to defragment only the next destina-
tion address [12].
A new scheme situated between computational secret
sharing and information dispersal algorithms was recently
introduced in a three pages poster [11]. Its complexity
and storage overhead are comparable to the one of the
IDAs, but it provides higher level of data confidentiality.
This paper significantly extends the previous proposal. It
contains detailed descriptions, as well as presents more
experimental security and performance analyses realized
on industrial data.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II sum-
marizes the notation used. Section III contains a de-
scription of our contribution. Section IV presents related
works. Section V describes the scheme. Section VI presents
its empirical security evaluation. Section VII contains a
cryptanalysis discussion. Section VIII shows performance
results. An insight into future works ends the paper.
II. Notation
In order to unify descriptions, we are introducing the
notation presented in Table I.
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TABLE I: Notations
d initial data
dsize size of the initial data
data chunk one or more consecutive bytes of original data
data share an encoded data chunk
fragment a final data fragment composed of data shares
and stored in one location
k number of fragments required for data recovery
l number of data chunks inside original data
n total number of fragments
DCS Data Chunk Set, a set k of data chunks
DSS Data Share Set, a set k of data shares
S seed, a set of k pseudorandom values
III. Our contribution
The proposed algorithm fragments initial data d of size
dsize into n fragments of a size close to dsizek , any k of which
are needed for data recovery. Initial data are processed by
sets of k chunks. Data encoding is not based on a matrix
multiplication, but on a modification of Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme [26] and depends on the encoding results of
the previously processed k data chunks. A pseudo-random
seed is used as the first set of data chunks and dispersed
within the data.
The main benefits of such scheme are:
• No symmetric key encryption is applied, the process-
ing makes use only of simple operations.
• Data patterns are not being preserved inside frag-
ments and the content verification is not straightfor-
ward(in contrast to IDAs).
• Partial data defragmentation is possible(in contrast
to schemes based on the all-or-nothing transform).
IV. Related works
This section presents most relevant works from the
domains of secret sharing and information dispersal.
A. Information Dispersal Algorithms
An Information Dispersal Algorithm [21] divides data
d into n fragments of size dsizek each, so that any k
fragments suffice for reconstruction. More precisely, n data
fragments are obtained by multiplying initial data by a
k× n nonsingular generator matrix . Recovery consists in
multiplying any k fragments by the inverse of a k× k ma-
trix built from k rows of the generator matrix. Information
dispersal adds redundancy to data and does not produce
storage overhead. In [14], Li analyzed the confidentiality of
IDAs. For instance, Rabin’s IDA proposal was evaluated
to have strong confidentiality, as the original data cannot
be explicitly reconstructed from fewer than the k required
fragments. However, even if it is not possible to directly
recover the data, some information about the content
of the initial data is leaked. Indeed, data patterns are
preserved inside the fragments when the same matrix is
reused to encode different data chunks. A similar problem
occurs while using the Electronic Code Book block cipher
mode for block cipher symmetric encryption [8].
B. Shamir’s secret sharing
Shamir’s perfect secret sharing scheme [26] takes as in-
put data d and fragments them into n fragments f1, ..., fn,
of which at least k are needed for data recovery. The
algorithm is based on the fact that given k unequal points
x1, ..., xk and arbitrary values f1, ..., fk there is at most
one polynomial y(x) of degree less or equal to k − 1
such that y(xi) = fi, i = 1, ..., k. The algorithm provides
with the highest level of confidentiality, but has quadratic
complexity in function of k and produces fragments of size
equal to the initial data. Therefore, it is usually applied
for protection of smaller data like encryption keys. In such
a use case, drawbacks of the scheme are acceptable, but
for larger data they may be a major obstacle.
C. Secret Sharing Made Short
Krawczyk’s Secret Sharing Made Short (SSMS) [13]
combines symmetric encryption with perfect secret sharing
for protection of larger data. Data d are encrypted using
a symmetric encryption algorithm, then fragmented using
an Information Dispersal Algorithm. The encryption key is
fragmented using a perfect secret sharing scheme and dis-
persed within data fragments. In consequence, the solution
does not require explicit key management. The storage
overhead does not depend on data size, but is equal to
the size of the key per data fragment. The performance of
the SSMS technique depends on the details of the chosen
encryption and IDA techniques.
D. AONT-RS
The AONT-RS technique [23] is similar to SSMS, as
it combines symmetric encryption with data dispersal. It
applies an all-or-nothing transform(AONT) [24] to create
k fragments: encrypted data are divided into k − 1 frag-
ments and an additional fragment is generated by xor-
ing hashes of these data fragments with the key used for
encryption. Additional n−k fragments are produced using
a systematic Reed-Solomon error correction code. Data
integrity is ensured by the use of a canary that is dispersed
within the fragments.
E. Parakh’s scheme
A steganographic threshold scheme presented in [19]
transforms k data chunks into n data fragments using a
single polynomial of degree k − 1. The size of produced
fragments depends on the value of k: it decreases while the
number of data chunks and the degree of the polynomial
are growing.
V. Fragmentation algorithm
This section describes in details the processing core of
the proposed fragmentation scheme. Algorithm 1 presents
the steps of the fragmentation procedure. Data defragmen-
tation is not presented in the form of an algorithm, as it
is basically a direct inverse of fragmentation.
Data processing flow Initial data d are treated as
a concatenation of l data chunks. These l data chunks
are encoded one by one into l data shares. Further, n
fragments are constructed from data shares in a way that
k fragments are sufficient for the recovery of d. For a
more convenient processing, data chunks are regrouped
into Data Chunk Sets of k elements, where DCSi(j) is
the jth data chunk in the set i. Initial data d may be then
presented as a concatenation of DCSs: DCS1, ..., DCSm
(m = d lk e). Similarly, data shares are regrouped into Data
Share Sets of k elements, so the result of encoding is
a concatenation of DSSs: DSS1, ..., DSSm. At the end,
data shares are distributed to k final fragments and n− k
redundant fragments are added.
Fig. 1: Example for k = 3: data chunks are transformed
into data shares. Encoding of DCSi is based on DSSi−1. A
pseudorandom seed serves as DSS0. DSS1(2) comes from
a transformation of DCS1(2). DSS0(1) and DSS0(3) were
used as coefficients of the encoding polynomial.
Encoding Data processing is done in a Shamir’s like
fashion: each data chunk is encoded as a constant term
of a polynomial of degree k − 1. More precisely, a data
chunk is transformed into a data share inside the function
Encode. Encode takes as parameters the value of the
data chunk to be encoded, coefficients Coeffs of the
polynomial, and a point x at which the polynomial will
be evaluated. For each data chunk, x and Coeffs are
calculated in function of DSSi−1 and j. Therefore, to
recover a single data chunk, a user has to possess the DSSi
containing the result of Encode for that data chunk, as
well as the previous DSSi−1. An example of that is shown
in Figure 1. Reusing of data shares trades the perfect
security of Shamir’s scheme for a better performance
and a smaller size of fragments: during processing the
polynomial is evaluated only at one value. Varying not
only the polynomial coefficients, but also the values of x,
prevents the preservation of data patterns inside encoded
fragments.
Seed The Encode function transforming a data chunk
into a data share takes as input k− 1 values of previously
encoded data shares. The first set of data chunks DCS1
does not possess a predecessor. Thus, a seed composed of
k pseudorandom values is introduced as DSS0.
Distributing to fragments After data encoding, data
shares are distributed over k final fragments f1, ..., fk
inside the DistributeShares function, in a way that a data
share DSSi(j) goes to a fragment fj .
Adding redundancy In a final step n − k redun-
dant fragments fk+1, ..., fn are added by the function
AddRedundancy implementing a systematic version of a
Reed-Solomon error correction code [22].
Algorithm 1 Fragmentation procedure
1: d = DCS1, ..., DCSm
2: DSS0 = s1, ..., sk
3: for i = 1 : m do
4: for j = 1 : k do
5: x = j ⊕DSSi−1(j)
6: if x == 0 then x = 1
7: end if
8: Coeffs = DSSi−1 \DSSi−1(j)
9: DSSi(j) = Encode(DCSi(j), Coeffs, x)
10: end for
11: end for
12: f1, ..., fk = DistributeShares(DSS0, ..., DSSm)
13: fk+1, ..., fn = AddRedundancy(f1, ..., fk)
A. Main characteristics
Complexity Data fragmentation into k fragments has
linear complexity O(k), as encoding a single data chunk is
equal to evaluating a value of a polynomial of degree k−1
at a single point. Processing redundant fragments depends
on the implementation of the error correction code. Same
for defragmentation.
Parallelization Defragmentation can strongly benefit
from parallelization, as each data chunk is recovered inde-
pendently from others. Larger data are divided into blocks
before applying Algorithm 1 to partially parallelize also
the fragmentation processing.
Partial defragmentation An interesting property of
the scheme is its fine-grained granularity during defrag-
mentation. Indeed, to defragment a single data chunk it
is only required to know its position inside a fragment, as
well as possess the previous data share set.
Fragment size The size of produced fragments is close
to the space efficient value of dsize/k, proposed by Rabin.
The only data overhead comes from the seed, which is
generated at the beginning of the fragmentation procedure
and then attached to data fragments. Seed size depends on
the chosen size of the data chunks, as seed values are of the
same size than data chunks. Therefore, the fragmentation
procedure produces a data overhead of size of one data
chunk per fragment.
VI. Experimental Security Evaluation
An experimental analysis of security characteristics of
the scheme based on the methodology presented in [15] was
performed. Tests were adapted to the fragmenting nature
of the scheme. For instance, we measured the behavior of
several parameters (entropy, correlation coefficient, proba-
bility density function) in function of number of fragments
k. A secure fragmentation algorithm should ensure high
level uniformity and independence of fragmented data.
Section VI-A and VI-B analyze these two properties.
Moreover, in Section VI-C we test the sensitivity of the
scheme to changes inside the seed.
All tests were performed using Matlab environment on
textual data samples provided by LaPoste1. An example
of one of such data sample is shown in Figure 2a. Its
corresponding fragment is presented in Figure 2c and
compared to the one obtained using an IDA (Figure 2b).
Matlab rand function was used for the generation of the
pseudorandom seed.
(a) Original data (b) IDA (c) Proposed scheme
Fig. 2: Distribution of a typical textual data sample (a)
and distributions of one of its fragments after applying an
IDA (b), and after applying the proposed approach (c), for
k=2. Data patterns are preserved after the use of an IDA.
Fragment (c) contains all possible byte values and does not
contain visible data patterns. x-axis shows the byte position
inside the sample, y-axis shows the value of the byte at
position x.
A. Uniformity
Encoded fragments should be characterized by high data
uniformity, which is an essential property of a scheme
resistant against frequency analysis. We measure frag-
ments uniformity by visualizing their probability density
functions, measuring their entropy, as well as applying the
chi-squared test.
1) Probability Density Function: Frequency counts close
to a uniform distribution testify data have a good level of
mixing. This means that each byte value inside a fragment
should have an occurrence probability close to 1v = 0.0039,
where v is the number of possible values (256 for a byte).
In Figure 3, the probability density function (PDF) of
a data sample and one of its fragment (for k = 2) are
shown. Results for the fragment are spread over the space
and have a distribution close to uniform. In Figure 4, the
PDF function is also shown, but for different values of k
1http://www.laposte.fr/
(from 2 to 20). It demonstrates clearly that the occurrence
probability of byte values is getting closer to 0.0039 as the
value of k is increasing.
Fig. 3: Probability density functions of data sample from
Figure 2a and its fragment from Figure 2c. x-axis shows
possible byte values in the sample, y-axis shows the proba-
bility of occurrence of a value.
Fig. 4: Probability density function in function of number
of fragments k for different fragments of the data sample
from Figure 2a. x-axis shows possible byte values in the
sample, the y-axis shows the probability of occurrence of a
value. k value varies from 2 (dark blue line) to 20 (dark
red line). With increasing of k the occurrence probability is
getting closer to the one of a uniform distribution (0.039).
2) Entropy: Information entropy is a measure of unpre-
dictability of information content [3]. In a good fragmenta-
tion scheme the entropy of the fragments should be as high
as possible. Figure 5 shows entropy variation for all data
fragments compared to entropy variation of original data.
The chosen data chunk size is equal to one byte, so the
maximum entropy value is equal to 8. The average mea-
sured value for overall fragments (7.9926) is significantly
higher than the one of original data (5.3498) and close to
the maximum. This consequently demonstrates that our
scheme ensures the uniformity property.
Furthermore, Figure 6 shows the entropy level in func-
tion of the number of fragments k. Each entropy value was
obtained as an average of entropy of fragmentation results
coming from 10 different data samples.The size of one data
fragment was set to 1000 bytes. The result shows that the
entropy is growing with the number of fragments: it starts
with a values close to 7.91 for a k = 2 and achieves 7.99
for values of k close to 20. Moreover, the entropy level
is in the same range of values for all k fragments coming
from one fragmentation result. This demonstrates that the
information is distributed evenly among the fragments.
Fig. 5: Entropy comparison between original and frag-
mented(with an IDA and with our scheme) data, tested for
100 different data samples, for k = 5. y-axis shows entropy
values (maximum entropy value is equal to 8), the x-axis
the number of the comparison test.
Fig. 6: Variation of entropy in the function of fragments
coming from different fragmentation results, k goes from
2 (dark blue dots) to 20 (dark red dots). x-axis shows the
fragment’s identifier, y-axis fragment’s entropy value.
3) Chi-squared test: Uniformity of data inside frag-
ments was validated by applying a chi-squared test [6].
For a significance level of 0.05 the null hypothesis is
not rejected and the distribution of the fragment data
is uniform if χ2test ≤ χ2theory(255, 0.05) ≈ 293. The test
was applied on fragmentation results of 15 different data
samples for a k going up to 20 and fragment size of
1000 bytes. For all values of k, the tests was successful.
There was no visible correlation between the number of
fragments k and the results of chi-squared test.
B. Independence
Fragmented data should be greatly different from its
original form. To evaluate fragments’ independence, we
analyze recurrence plots, as well as correlation and bit
difference between data and their fragments.
1) Recurrence: A recurrence plot serves to estimate
correlation inside data [25]. Considering data vector x =
x1, x2, ..., xm a vector with delay t ≥ 1 is constructed
x(t) = x1+t, x2+t, ..., xm+t. A recurrence plot shows the
variation between x and x(t). In Figure 7, such plots for
a data sample and its fragments obtained by applying
an IDA and the proposed scheme are shown. Using the
proposed scheme, no clear pattern is obtained after data
fragmentation.
(a) Original data (b) IDA (c) Proposed scheme
Fig. 7: Recurrence plots for data from Figure 2. x-axis
shows data values, y-axis shows data values with a delay
t = 1. No clear pattern is obtained for a fragment obtained
using the proposed scheme.
2) Correlation: Correlation coefficient is used to eval-
uate the linear dependence between data [25]. A secure
fragmentation algorithm should ensure as low correlation
as possible between initial data and their fragments.
Correlation coefficients were measured between 10 data
samples and their corresponding fragments for different
values of number of fragments k (from 2 to 20). The
method used for the calculation was same as in [10].
Results are shown in Figure 8. Observed values of correla-
tion coefficients are close to 0. This demonstrates that no
detectable correlation exists between tested data samples
and their fragments. Moreover, the correlation coefficients
for higher values of k tend to have lower values. Then,
the correlation between fragments coming from the same
fragmentation results was measured. Correlation coeffi-
cients among fragments were also close to 0 (in a range
of < −0.01, 0.02 >). It demonstrated that fragments are
not correlated with each other and thus confirmed the
independence property of the scheme.
3) Difference: Each fragment should be significantly
different from the initial data and from other fragments
of the same fragmentation result. Bit difference between a
data sample and each of its fragments was measured and
it was close to 50%. A similar result was obtained for the
difference between fragments themselves.
C. Sensitivity Test
Differential attacks study the relation between two ci-
phertexts resulting from a slight change, usually of one bit
in the original plaintext or in the key. Inspired by this fact,
a seed sensitivity test was realized in order to visualize the
impact of a change in the seed on the fragmentation result.
Indeed, two fragmentation results of same data should
be different while obtained using two distinct seeds. For
Fig. 8: Correlation coefficients in function of k. x-axis
shows the fragmentation identifier, y-axis shows the corre-
lation coefficient between a data sample and its fragment.
A correlation coefficient close to 0 indicates that there is no
correlation between original data and its fragment. Black
circles show the mean value of coefficients. With increasing
of k the mean values tend to be closer to 0.
same data sample of size of 4000 bytes, two fragmentation
results were obtained: one for a seed S1 and one for a seed
S2 that differs S1 by one random bit. The test has shown
that such two fragmentation results are not correlated
with each other (correlation coefficients close to 0) and
significantly different (around 50% of bit difference).
VII. Cryptanalysis Discussion
In this Section, we discuss about the confidentiality
level provided by the proposed algorithm ans its resistance
against most known types of attack scenarios [4], [16],
[17] (statistical, differential, chosen/known plain-text, and
brute-force) in a situation when fewer than k fragments
have been revealed. During such study, the steps of the
algorithm are considered to be public in compliance with
Kerckhoff’s principle.
A. General Security Properties
The threat model we use is the one where data frag-
ments are physically dispersed over n different storage
locations or transmission paths. Therefore, resulting data
protection relies essentially on the difficulty to collect k of
the fragments. Indeed, an attacker has to find the locations
or transmission paths of dispersed fragments and then
manage to access or eavesdrop them. In this paper, we
do not deal with data dispersal questions, which includes
ensuring the physical separation of fragments, as well as
protecting the information describing the order in which
fragments have to be assembled to reconstitute the original
data. Nevertheless information about the defragmenation
procedure should be stored in a secure location or dis-
persed within the fragments, as its importance could be
in a sense compared to the one of the encryption key.
The strength of our solution relies on the use of a
seed in form of k pseudo-random values, as well as on
unpredictability and high sensitivity of the fragments.
Moreover, a user have the possibility to adapt the security
level to their needs, not only by increasing the value of
number of fragments k, but also by augmenting the data
chunk size. The proposed scheme ensures forward and
backward secrecy, but only in a situation when the seed
values are not being repeated.
B. Most known types of attacks
In this Section we are analyzing the resistance of the
scheme to the most known types of attacks.
Statistical attacks The category of statistical attacks
exploits the fact that encoded data may reveal some sta-
tistical properties. Immunity against such attacks requires
that fragments achieve high level of randomness [27].
Therefore, in an ideal situation, the frequency analysis
of data inside a fragment should be indistinguishable
from the output of a pseudorandom generator. Results
presented in Section VI have shown that our scheme
achieve good uniformity and recurrence characteristics.
Indeed, no useful information can be detected from the
fragmented data. This demonstrates the high randomness
of the scheme and its resistance against statistical attacks.
Such property is not achieved by Information Dispersal
Algorithms, where in the case of a known generator matrix
and data with recognizable patterns it is possible to guess
the content of missing fragments.
Brute-force attack and content verification While
possessing a p < k number of fragments, an attacker can
attempt a brute-force attack by trying to guess the content
of the missing (k− p) fragments. Intuitively, the difficulty
level of such attack grows with the required number of
fragments k and decreases with the number of possessed
fragments p. The recovery of a set of k data shares of size w
each implicates trying 2w possibilities for k−p data shares
of missing fragments. Therefore, an increasing of the size
of a data chunk/share may harden the brute-force attack
on a set of k data chunks. On the other hand, a way of
facilitating the attack would be to make some assumptions
about the content of the missing fragments that would
limit the number of possibilities to verify.
In a different scenario, an attacker with less than k
fragments may like to verify whether the data inside
fragments matches some predetermined value. In the case
of an IDA, such verification is easy when the generator
matrix is known. In the case of our scheme, it is harder,
as the attacker will have to guess or the missing seed values
or the missing data shares used to encode the part of the
data they would like to verify.
Known and chosen plain text attacks The knowl-
edge of a part of the plaintext facilitates a brute-force
attack. However, as each time a new seed is used, it does
not help to recover fragments of other data.
Linear and differential attacks A linear attack con-
sists of exploiting the linear relations between the plain-
text, the ciphertext and the key. The knowledge of the
first data chunks from the plaintext and of the p fragments
allows the recovery of the missing seed values. However,
the recovery of the seed is not as critical, as the key leakage
in symmetric encryption schemes. Because fragments are
dependent of each others, to decode a data share it is
necessary to possess its preceding data shares, also the
one that are inside of the k − p missing fragments. In
order to avoid differential attacks, seed values have to be
change for each fragmentation procedure. A reuse of the
seed could expose some relations between fragmentation
results, for instance the fragmentation result of two iden-
tical plaintexts would be the same. As presented in Section
VI-C, encoded data show high seed sensitivity, so even a
single bit change is sufficient to obtain two different and
not correlated fragmentation results of the same plain text.
VIII. Performance Results
Proposed algorithm was implemented in JAVA using the
following resources: JDK 1.8 on DELL Latitude E6540,
X64-based PC running on Intel R© CoreTM i7-4800MQ CPU
@ 2.70 GHz with 8 GB RAM, under Windows 7. It was
tested on data provided by La Poste, the French postal of-
fice. An implementation of java.security.SecureRandom
is used for seed generation. The scheme can be imple-
mented in any GF (2Q) and is designed to use only logical
operations. For integrity purposes, Q is selected according
to word size of processors and can be 8,16, 32 or 64-bit.
As presented in Figure 9, the variation of average time
for fragmentation is linear. Similar results were obtained
for the defragmentation process. A multi-threaded version,
optimized for 4 cores, sped up the performance by a
factor of 3 that becomes close to 4 for more intensive
computations.
Another test was performed on the tera-memory plat-
form TeraLab2 using following resources: 32GB RAM and
4 VCPUs. Figure 10 shows the results for fragmentation
of a data file of 100MB up to 100 fragments. This result
exhibits the linear complexity of the fragmentation rela-
tively to k the number of generated fragments. Figure 11
presents performance measured in function of data size
for several values of k. Similar results were obtained for
the defragmentation process. Results demonstrate that the
scheme achieves good scalability.
IX. Future Works
In future, we plan to benchmark our algorithm to com-
pare its performance with most relevant works. A possibil-
ity of performance improvement is seen in parallelization
of the fragmentation processing by partially limiting the
sequential character of the encoding procedure. A more
sophisticated way of distribution of encoded data chunks
could be also envisioned in order to create fragments
taking into account several levels of confidentiality. Such
processing would require an additional step in form of the
separation of initial data chunks regarding their level of
confidentiality. It could be inspired by works done in [20],
2https://www.teralab-datascience.fr
Fig. 9: Performance measured on a portable computer.
Variation of the average fragmentation time, single-
threaded implementation, k = 2, 6, 8.
Fig. 10: Performance measured on the TeraLab platform.
Variation of the average fragmentation time for values of
k from 2 to 100. Data sample size is equal to 100MB. The
multi-threaded version of the code was optimized to use 4
threads.
Fig. 11: Performance measured on the TeraLab platform.
Variation of the average fragmentation time in function of
data size for the single-threaded version of the application
for a data size up to 20GB.
that use wavelet transform to separate data into two parts,
a private and a public one, without any user interaction.
Another, more complex, research track would be to
design a complete fragmentation architecture for data
protection by means of fragmentation, encryption, and
dispersion. This work would focus on secure management
of information about the location and order of data frag-
ments, as well as on secure distribution of fragments from
the trusted site performing fragmentation procedure to
their final storage destinations.
X. Conclusion
A novel fragmentation algorithm for secure and resilient
distributed data storage was described and analyzed. It
combines the keyless property, computational simplicity
and space efficient size of fragment of Information Dis-
persal Algorithms with an adjustable computational level
of security. Security analysis shows that the produced
fragments achieve good randomness and are not correlated
neither with the initial data, nor among themselves. The
use of a fresh seed for each fragmentation procedure
ensures the backward and forward secrecy properties, as
well as limits the possibility of differential attacks. Brute-
force and chosen-plaintext attacks could be considered in
some situations. Their attack resistance depends on the
number of fragments in the possession of an attacker, as
well as the quantity of knowledge about of the initial data.
The scheme was implemented and tested on different
samples of industrial data. Tests show good performance
and scalability. The fragmentation procedure is linear in
terms of number of fragments.
We believe that the scheme could be applied to all
application of data storage or transmission, where we
would like to hide the nature of fragmented data without
applying cryptographic mechanisms.
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